Thomas L. Em Malaca, Lusitania Sacra, v. Francesc X. Segunda edicion, augmentada por el mismo autor. La II, De la S. Cene e de la Messe. A Saumur, par Thomas Portau. A Saumur, par Thomas Portau, London: John Harison, Amsterdam: Paulus Matthysz, Encontra-se na Bodleian of Oxford. Cipriano de Valera, Los dos tratados del Papa, i de la Misa, Ahora fielmente reimpresos. Colom- bo, Traduzido e acrescentado tudo, ago- ra de novo, pelo P.
Van den Eede, In: Onderscheydt der Christenheydt. Traduzido e acrescentado tudo, agora de novo, pelo P. If compassion be not in reality a virtue, or do not possess the importance attributed to it by philosophers and moralists, then by all means let the fact be avowed by these who hold this opinion, and let them frame a programme for the future guidance of society in which pity shall have no part.
But if we still believe in the efficacy of sympathy, love, and the link of universal brotherhood, then I submit that this compassionate instinct demands from us a more systematic study than it has hitherto received: it deserves better than to be rejected with cold indifference or advocated with ill-balanced enthusiasm. Why should we drift on without a guiding principle — saving life with one hand, only to take it with the other; asserting the sacredness of human existence, while we know that fellow-creatures all around us are worse than dying under the death-in-life of penury and distress; sentimentalising, when we walk abroad, about our love for the beasts and birds in meadow and woodland, and then returning home to display our still stronger liking for them, as they appear on our dinner-tables in their other and more familiar aspect?
Instead of fostering that dull insensibility which is closely allied to cruelty, we must cultivate the higher and more imaginative moral instincts, so that the immense power of habit, which has hitherto been uniformly opposed to humaneness, may now be enlisted in its behalf. But the humaneness which we advocate must, if not wholly.
I make this limitation, because it must be conceded that in humanitarianism, as in other branches of ethics, absolute consistency is impossible. Morality being progressive, there is no given point in our moral development where we can hold a perfectly logical and unassailable position; there are always indications of a further forward movement and an expansion of the whole moral horizon; so that it may be prognosticated that our sympathies, as they advance, will embrace a wider and ever widening circle, and there will never be a final and absolute standard of humanitarian ethics.
It must be granted that there are certain complex and difficult questions as, for instance, the right of civilized nations to interfere with savage tribes, or the right of mankind to enslave the lower animal , the full solution of which must be left to some future generation, the time being not yet ripe for the moralization of subjects which at present do not evoke any definite moral feeling. But because the whole journey cannot be accomplished at one stride, it does not follow that no step should be taken; the humanitarian should attack the worst.
But that other incongruity, of attacking minor abuses, while he leaves the grosser ones unchallenged, he cannot afford to overlook; for if he do so he cuts the ground from under his own feet, and retards the very movement of which he desires the advancement. These gradations of humanity, which, if not logical, are at least natural and unavoidable, are indicated, as I have already said, by the instinct of compassion, which is excited in proportion, not only to the amount of the suffering, but also to the nearness, and, above all, the sensibility of the sufferer.
The more keenly the agony is felt, the greater is the duty of the humanitarian to relieve it. At the same time I venture to surmise at the risk of being thought too fanciful that the scope of humane feeling will gradually be expanded until it includes much that is at present held to be outside the pale of sympathy.
We owe justice to men, and grace and benignity to other creatures that are capable of it. There is a natural commerce and mutual obligation betwixt them and us. There could scarcely be a better profession of the humanitarian faith than that contained. It is no exaggeration to say that the answer which history shall give to this question will largely determine the future course of civilized society.
The present age is confessedly one of transition, in religious and moral belief; the old faiths are dying or dead, and we look for some new motive-power to take their place in the future. This coming creed, which shall interpret and reconcile the Babel of conflicting utterances by which we are now bewildered, seems likely to be none other than a religion of humanity — humanity in no narrower sense than compassion, love, justice for every living creature; for in proportion as such gentleness is more and more inculcated and practised shall we be drawing nearer and nearer to a true civilization, a society in which all harmless and healthy life shall be free to develop itself unrestricted and uninjured.
It has been the object of this paper to show that there is a natural and necessary correlation between the various phases of humane sentiment, and that, if one be recognized, it is unreasonable to refuse acceptance to the rest. What has been said of humanitarianism as a saving and guiding faith is no mere supposition.
Great changes cannot. But in Compassion, whether we regard it as a primary instinct or an acquired faculty, there is a solid and incontrovertible basis, on which may be founded, and indeed has been founded, an ethical creed, which has the advantage of being at once popular and philosophical, appealing unmistakably to the sympathy and the intellect of the wisest and the simplest of mankind.
Humanitarianism has done much in the past to alleviate misery and suffering, in spite of the many obstacles by which its progress has been retarded: it will do still more in the future, if its leading principle, once deliberately adopted, be followed out, rationally and fearlessly, to its just and inevitable conclusion. Publius Syrus. THE Humanitarian League has been established in the belief that the promulgation of a high and positive system of morality in the conduct of life, in all its aspects, is one of the greatest needs of the time. It will assert as the basis of that system an intelligible and consistent principle of humaneness, viz.
This principle the Humanitarian League will apply and emphasise in those cases where it appears to be most flagrantly overlooked, and will protest not only against the cruelties inflicted by men on men, in the name of law, authority and conventional usage, but also in accordance with the same sentiment of humanity against the wanton ill-treatment of the lower animals. The Humanitarian League will therefore demand the thorough revision and more equitable administration of the present Criminal Code, under which a very large amount of injustice and oppression is still frequently perpetrated.
It will deprecate the various provocations and incentives to aggressive warfare, and will point to the evils that result from the ever-increasing array of military and naval armaments. It will insist on the recognition by the community of its primary duty — the protection of the weak and helpless, and will urge the need of amending a condition of society under which a large portion of the people is in a state of chronic destitution. Furthermore, in view of the increasing evidence of the sufficiency of a non-flesh diet, the Humanitarian League will aim at the prevention of the terrible sufferings to which countless numbers of highly-organised animal are yearly subjected through the habit of flesh-eating, which is directly responsible for the barbarities of the cattle-traffic and the shambles, and will advocate, as an initial measure, the abolition of private slaughter-houses, the presence of which in our large centres is admitted to be a cause of widespread demoralisation.
It will contend that the practice of vivisection is incompatible with the fundamental principles both of humanity and sound science, and that the infliction of suffering for ends purely selfish, such as sport, fashion, profit, and professional advancement, is largely instrumental in debasing the general standard of morality. The Humanitarian League will look to its members to do their utmost, both in private and public, to promote the above-mentioned scheme. Its work will involve no sort of rivalry with that of any existing institution; on the contrary, it is designed to supplement and reinforce such efforts as have already been organised for similar objects.
The distinctive purpose and guiding policy of the League will be to consolidate and give consistent expression to these principles of humaneness, the recognition of which is essential to the understanding and realisation of all that is highest and best in Humanity. By becoming members and inducing others to do the same.
The condition of membership is the acceptance of the general principle not necessarily of the complete programme set forth in the Manifesto. By subscribing liberally. The minimum annual subscription is half-a-crown, a subscriber being entitled to receive a copy of each pamphlet issued by the League.
By uniting in simultaneous efforts to direct public attention to the purposes of the League. This can be done by personal influence, by public lectures, by papers read before debating societies, by letters addressed to local journals, etc. The Committee proposes to take up from time to time such questions as may seem to be especially urgent or opportune, and to issue a uniform series of numbered pamphlets dealing successively with these subjects.
Local booksellers should be requested to keep the series in stock. The publisher is Mr. Reeves, Fleet Street, E. Members can obtain copies on special terms, by application to the Hon. By furnishing the Executive Committee with any information that is likely to be of value. Members or friends who have made a special study of any particular branch of humanitarianism, and are willing to lecture or write thereon, or to make a donation towards the issue of a pamphlet on that subject, are requested to communicate with the Hon.
Edited by Edward Maitland. Dreams and Dream Stories. By Anna Kingsford. Ludgate Hill. Vegetarianism in Connection with the Religion of Humanity. By William Frey. The Hygienic Advertiser. The Vegetarian Messenger. The Organ of the New Fellowship, Quarterly. The Christian Socialist. William Reeves, , Fleet Street, E. Nature Notes. Sotheran, , Strand. Como escreve F. Os debates foram extremamente ricos. Viviane: As pessoas mesmas se qualificam?
Viviane: Como fazer isso? All rights reserved. Abstract: This is a highly selective review of the huge literature bearing on the capacity of mass electorates for issue voting, in view of the great mal distribution of political information across the public, with special attention to the implications of information heterogeneity for alternative methods of research. I trace the twists and turns in understanding the meaning of high levels of response instability on survey policy items from their discovery in the first panel studies of to the current day.
I consider the recent great elaboration of diverse heuristics that voters use to reason with limited information, as well as evidence that the aggregation of preferences so central to democratic process serves to improve the apparent quality of the electoral response. A few recent innovations in design and analysis hold promise of illuminating this topic from helpful new angles.
Being revolted by the question formulation, I instantly declined to participate. Long ago I had written two essays Converse , to convey limitations on political information in the electorate. Consequently, I found myself typecast, in some quarters at least, as an apostle of voter ignorance. Hence my aversion. Shortly, however, I decided that with a change of title I could take the assignment. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study.
In an earlier period, the behaviorist decree that subjective states lie beyond the realm of proper measurement gave Mannheim a justification for turning his back on measurement, for he had an unqualified interest in discussing belief systems. This fragment of history, along with many others, serves to remind us that no intellectual position is likely to become obsolete quite so rapidly as one that takes current empirical capability as the limit of the possible in a more absolute sense.
This article makes no pretense of surpassing such limitations. At the same time, our substantive concern forces upon us an unusual concern Critical Review 18 , nos. Originally published in David E. Apter, ed. Republished by permission of the author and the editor. Philip E. The fact that these ideational worlds differ in character poses problems of adequate representation and measurement. The vertical ordering of actors and beliefs that we wish to plumb bears some loose resemblance to the vertical line that might be pursued downward through an organization or political movement from the narrow cone of top leadership, through increasing numbers of subordinate officials, and on through untitled activists to the large base formally represented in membership rolls.
We are aware that attention to numbers, more or less customary in democratic thought, is very nearly irrelevant in many political settings.
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- Сказка о белой кобылице (Russian Edition)?
- Edward the Eighth( An Assembly Play).
- Traducciones, público y mecenazgo en Castilla (siglo XV);
Generally, the logic of numbers collides head on with the logic of power, as the traditional power pyramid, expressing an inverse relation between power and numbers, communicates so well. The weight of this resource varies in a systematic and obvious way according to the political context.
In a frankly designed and stable oligarchy, it is assumed to have no weight at all. In such a setting, the numbers of people associated with particular belief systems, if known at all, becomes important only in periods of crisis or challenge to the existing power structure. Democratic theory greatly increases the weight accorded to numbers in the daily power calculus. However this may be, claims to numbers are of some modest continuing importance in democratic systems for the legitimacy they confer upon demands; and, much more sporadically, claims to numbers become important in nondemocratic systems as threats of potential coercion.
We define a belief system as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence. We depend implicitly upon such notions of constraint in judging, for example, that, if a person is opposed to the expansion of Social Security, he is probably a conservative and is probably opposed as well to any nationalization of private industries, federal aid to education, sharply progressive income taxation, and so forth.
Most discussions of ideologies make relatively elaborate assumptions about such constraints. Constraint must be treated, of course, as a matter of degree, and this degree can be measured quite readily, at least as an average among individuals. The most obvious form of such constraint although in some ways the most trivial is exemplified by a structure of propositions in logic, in which a change in the truth-value of one proposition necessitates changes in truth-value elsewhere within the set of related propositions.
Psychologically, of course, there may be equally strong constraint among idea-elements that would not be apparent to logical analysis at all, as we shall see. We might characterize either the idea-elements themselves or entire belief systems in terms of many other dimensions. Only two will interest us here. First, the idea-elements within a belief system vary in a Downloaded At: 22 November 4 Critical Review Vol. That is, when new information changes the status of one idea-element in the belief system, by postulate some other change must occur as well.
There are usually, however, several possible changes in status elsewhere in the system, any one of which would compensate for the initial change. Let us further imagine that the party then changes its position to the opposing side of the issue. Once the information about the change reaching the actor has become so unequivocal that he can no longer deny that the change has occurred, he has several further choices.
Two of the more important ones involve either a change in attitude toward the party or a change in position on the issue. In such an instance, the element more likely to change is defined as less central to the belief system than the element that, so to speak, has its stability ensured by the change in the first element.
Perhaps the most hackneyed illustration of this point is that of the miser, to whom money has become an end rather than a means. Whole belief systems may also be compared in a rough way with respect to the range of objects that are referents for the ideas and attitudes in the system. Such other belief systems as, for example, one that links control of the means of production with the social functions of religion and a doctrine of aesthetics all in one more or less neat package have extreme ranges.
This focus brings us close to what are broadly called ideologies, and we shall use the term for aesthetic relief where it seems most appropriate. The term originated in a narrower context, however, and is still often reserved for subsets of belief systems or parts of such systems that the user suspects are insincere; that he wishes to claim have certain functions for social groupings; or that have some special social source or some notable breadth of social diffusion.
This point is of sufficient importance to dwell upon. Logical Sources of Constraint Within very narrow portions of belief systems, certain constraints may be purely logical.
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For example, government revenues, government expenditures, and budget balance are three idea-elements that suggest some purely logical constraints. One cannot believe that government expenditures should be increased, that government revenues should be decreased, and that a more favorable balance of the budget should be achieved all at the same time.
Of course, the presence of such objectively logical constraints does not ensure that subjective constraints will be felt by the actor. They will be felt only if these idea-elements are brought together in the same belief system, and there is no guarantee that they need be. Yet one week later the questionnaire was applied again, and changes of response to the syllogistic propositions reduced significantly the measurable level of logical inconsistency.
Furthermore, if a legislator is noted for his insistence upon budgetbalancing and tax-cutting, we can predict with a fair degree of success that he will also tend to oppose expansion of government welfare activities. If, however, a voter becomes numbered within his sphere of influence by virtue of having cast a vote for him directly out of enthusiasm for his tax-cutting policies, we cannot predict that the voter is opposed as well to expansion of government welfare services.
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- Theory of emotions: Emotions (Theory of psychology Book 2).
Indeed, if an empirical prediction is possible, it may run in an opposing direction, although the level of constraint is so feeble that any comment is trivial. Psychological Sources of Constraint Whatever may be learned through the use of strict logic as a type of constraint, it seems obvious that few belief systems of any range at all depend for their constraint upon logic in this classical sense. There is a broad gulf between strict logic and the quasi-logic of cogent argument.
And where the elements in the belief system of a population represent looser cultural accumulations, the question of logical consistency is even less appropriate. If one visits a Shaker community, for example, one finds a group of people with a clear-cut and distinctive belief system that requires among other things plain dress, centrality of religious concerns, celibacy for all members, communal assumptions about work and property, antagonism to political participation in the broader state, and a general aura of retirement from the secular world. The visitor whose sense of constraint has been drawn from belief configurations of such other retiring sects as the Amish is entirely surprised to discover that the Shakers have no abhorrence of technological progress but indeed greatly prize it.
Similar surprise has been registered at idea-elements brought together by such movements as Peronism and Italian Fascism by observers schooled to expect other combinations. Indeed, were one to survey a limited set of ideas on which many belief systems have registered opposite postures, it would be interesting to see how many permutations of positions have been held at one time or another by someone somewhere.
Such diversity is testimony to an absence of any strict logical constraints among such idea-elements, if any be needed. What is important is that the elites familiar with the total shapes of these belief systems have experienced them as logically constrained clusters of ideas, within which one part necessarily follows from another. Thus a few crowning postures—like premises about survival of the fittest in the spirit of social Darwinism—serve as a sort of glue to bind together many more specific attitudes and beliefs, and these postures are of prime centrality in the belief system as a whole.
In the first place, were we to survey the combinations of idea-elements that have occurred historically in the fashion suggested above , we should undoubtedly fmd that certain postures tend to co-occur and that this co-occurrence has obvious roots in the configuration of interests and information that characterize particular niches in the social structure. For example, if we were informed that dissension was rising within the Roman Catholic Church over innovations designed to bring the priest more intimately into the milieu of the modern worker, we could predict with a high degree of success that such a movement would have the bulk of its support among the bas-clergS and would encounter indifference or hostility at the higher status levels of the hierarchy.
Of course, such predictions are in no sense free from error, and surprises are numerous. Developmentally, they have status similar to the classic example of the spurious correlation—two terms that are correlated because of a common link to some third and prior variable. In the case of the belief system, arguments are developed to lend some more positive rationale to the fact of constraint: The idea-elements go together not simply because both are in the interest of the person holding a particular status but for more abstract and quasi-logical reasons developed from a coherent world view as well.
First, the shaping of belief systems of any range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a minuscule proportion of any population. Not that the more avid consumer never supplies personal innovations on the fringes—he is very likely to suppress an idea-element here, to elaborate one there, or even to demur at an occasional point. Such constraint through diffusion is important, for it implies a dependence upon the transmission of information. If information is not successfully transmitted, there will be little constraint save that arising from the first social source.
Where transmission of information is at stake, it becomes important to distinguish between two classes of information. Simply put, these two levels are what goes with what and why. Such levels of information logically stand in a scalar relationship to one another, in the sense that one can hardly arrive at an understanding of why two ideas go together without being aware that they are supposed to go together.
One the other hand, it is easy to know that two ideas go together without knowing why. The first level of information, then, is simple and straightforward.
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The general premise is that the first type of information will be diffused much more readily than the second because it is less complex. Of course, the ordering of individuals on this vertical information scale is largely due to differences in education, but it is strongly modified as well by different specialized interests and tastes that individuals have acquired over time one for politics, another for religious activity, another for fishing, and so forth.
Consequences of Declining Information for Belief Systems It is our primary thesis that, as one moves from elite sources of belief systems downwards on such an information scale, several important things occur. The net result, as one moves downward, is that constraint declines across the universe of idea-elements, and that the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower. Instead of a few wide-ranging belief systems that organize large amounts of specific information, one would expect to find a proliferation of clusters of ideas among which little constraint is felt, even, quite often, in instances of sheer logical constraint.
Most of these changes have been hinted at in one form or another in a variety of sources. But most of the stuff of politics—particularly that played on a national or international stage—is, in the nature of things, remote and abstract. Where politics is concerned, therefore, such ideational changes begin to occur rapidly below the extremely thin stratum of the electorate that ever has occasion to make public pronouncements on political affairs. In other words, the changes in belief systems of which we speak are not a pathology limited to a thin and disoriented bottom layer of the lumpenproletariat; they are immediately relevant in understanding the bulk of mass political behavior.
It is this latter fact which seems to be consistently misunderstood by the sophisticated analysts who comment in one vein or another on the meaning of mass politics. A member of that tiny elite that comments publicly about political currents probably some fraction of i percent of a population spends most of his time in informal communication about politics with others in the same select group.
He rarely encounters a conversation in which his assumptions of shared contextual grasp of political ideas are challenged. Intellectually, he has learned that the level of information in the mass public is low, but he may dismiss this knowledge as true of only 10 to 20 percent of the voters, who affect the course of mass political events in insignificant ways if at all. From the point of view of the actor, the idea organization that leads to constraint permits him to locate and make sense of a wider range of information from a particular domain than he would find possible without such organization.
The circumstances under which such tremendous amounts of information are conveyed by the single word are, however, twofold. First, the actor must bring a good deal of meaning to the term, which is to say that he must understand the constraints surrounding it. The more impoverished his understanding of the term, the less information it conveys.
In the limiting case—if he does not know at all what the term means—it conveys no information at all. Second, the system of beliefs and actors referred to must in fact be relatively constrained: To the degree that constraint is lacking, uncertainty is less reduced by the label, and less information is conveyed. The psychological economies provided by such yardsticks for actors are paralleled by economies for analysts and theoreticians who wish to describe events in the system parsimoniously.
Indeed, the search for adequate overarching dimensions on which large arrays of events may be simply understood is a critical part of synthetic description. Such syntheses are more or less satisfactory, once again, according to the degree of constraint operative among terms in the system being described. That is, a man whose belief system was relatively conservative Dwight D. Furthermore, for a brief period at least, the composition of Congress was more heavily Republican as well, and this shift meant on balance a greater proportion of relatively conservative legislators.
Since the administration and Congress were the elites responsible for the development and execution of policies, the flavor of governmental action did indeed take a turn in a conservative direction. These observations are proper description. The causes underlying these changes in leadership, however, obviously lay with the mass public, which had changed its voting patterns sufficiently to bring the Republican elites into power.
And this change in mass voting was frequently interpreted as a shift in public mood from liberal to conservative, a mass desire for a period of respite and consolidation after the rapid liberal innovations of the s and s. Such an account presumes, once again, that constraints visible at an elite level are mirrored in the mass public and that a person choosing to vote Republican after a decade or two of Democratic voting saw himself in some sense or other as giving up a more liberal choice in favor of a more conservative one.
On the basis of some familiarity with attitudinal materials drawn from cross-section samples of the electorate,16 this assumption seems thoroughly implausible. It suggests in the first instance a neatness of organization in perceived political worlds, which, while accurate enough for elites, is a poor fit for the perceptions of the common public. They therefore provide some indication of the evaluative dimensions that tend to be spontaneously applied to politics by such a national sample. Our initial analytic question had to do with the prevalence of such usage.
It soon became apparent, however, that such respondents were in a Downloaded At: 22 November 14 Critical Review Vol. At this point, we broadened the inquiry to an assessment of the evaluative dimensions of policy significance relating to political issues, rather than to the way a candidate dresses, smiles, or behaves in his private life that seemed to be employed in lieu of such efficient yardsticks as the liberal-conservative continuum.
In the first or top level were placed those respondents who did indeed rely in some active way on a relatively abstract and far-reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting policy significance over time were evaluated. We did not require that this dimension be the liberal-conservative continuum itself, but it was almost the only dimension of the sort that occurred empirically.
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In a second stratum were placed those respondents who mentioned such a dimension in a peripheral way but did not appear to place much evaluative dependence upon it or who used such concepts in a fashion that raised doubt about the breadth of their understanding of the meaning of the term. It is quite true that such a syndrome is closer to the upper levels of conceptualization than are any of the other types to be described.
These people have a clear image of politics as an arena of group interests and, provided that they have been properly advised on where their own group interests lie, they are relatively likely to follow such advice. Unless an issue directly concerns their grouping in an obviously rewarding or punishing way, however, they lack the contextual grasp of the system to recognize how they should respond to it without being told by elites who hold their confidence.
Furthermore, their interest in politics is not sufficiently strong that they pay much attention to such communications. If they fail to receive such communication, which is most unusual, knowledge of their group memberships may be of little help in predicting their responses.
Bíblia Original CódEX
One respondent whom we encountered classified himself as a strong Socialist. He was a Socialist because he knew that Socialists stood four-square for the working man against the rich, and he was a working man. This case illustrates well what we mean by constraint between idea-elements and how such constraint depends upon a store of relevant information. But, for lack of information, the belief system more or less began and ended there.
It strikes us as valid to distinguish such a belief system from that of the doctrinaire socialist. In this instance, a very little probing makes clear that this assumption of shared information is once again false. The fourth level was, to some degree, a residual category, intended to include those respondents who invoked some policy considerations in their evaluations yet employed none of the references meriting location in any of the first three levels. Two main modes of policy evaluation were characteristic of this level. There was no hint in these responses that any groupings in the society suffered differentially from disaster or profited excessively in more pleasant times: These fortunes or misfortunes were those that one party or the other had decided in some cases, apparently, on whim to visit upon the nation as a whole.
The second type included those respondents whose only approach to an issue reference involved some single narrow policy for which they felt personal gratitude or indignation toward a party or candidate like Social Security or a conservation program. In these responses, there was no indication that the speakers saw programs as representative of the broader policy postures of the parties.
The fifth level included those respondents whose evaluations of the political scene had no shred of policy significance whatever. Some of these responses were from people who felt loyal to one party or the other but confessed that they had no idea what the party stood for. Others devoted their attention to personal qualities of the candidates, indicating disinterest in parties more generally. Still others confessed that they paid too little attention to either the parties or the current candidates to be able to say anything about them. Furthermore, these correlations were strong enough so that each maintained some residual life when the other two items were controlled, despite the strong underlying relationship between education, information, and involvement.
Ideologues II. Near-ideologues III. Group interest IV Nature of the times V. The array is instructive as a portrait of a mass electorate, to be laid against the common elite assumption that all or a significant majority of the public conceptualizes the main lines of politics after the manner of the most highly educated. Cargos religiosos. Artigos religiosos. Jesus Cristo. Ver artigo principal: Dez Mandamentos.
Wigoder, Geoffrey, ed. Posner, Harvard University Press, , p. Bromiley, , p. Rodman Williams, p. Jersild, , p. Unger, Merrill F.